

РОЗДІЛ 1. ТЕОРІЯ ТА ІСТОРІЯ ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ НАУКИ

Bidochko Lesia Yaroslavivna

Research strategy of cultural materialism: Case of the Ukrainian left at the turn of the centuries

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Bidochko Lesia Yaroslavivna
Postgraduate Student at the Department
of Political Science
of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Doctoral School
Voloska Str. 8/5, Kyiv, Ukraine

The purpose of this article is to check the relevance of the theoretical basis of cultural materialism, correlating it with our own analysis of the left segment of the Ukraine's political life during the period of independence. In this analysis, we tried to identify the infrastructural, structural and superstructural factors that determined the dynamics of the political process, and also to clarify the causal priority existing between them. In the national elections of 1994, 1998, 1999, left political parties have demonstrated impressive results and some positive dynamics. Each time since the 2002 parliamentary elections, they received fewer votes and reduced their presence in the Verkhovna Rada. In the 2000s, reduction of the "political weight" of the Left was more intensive than its growth in the 1990s. Economic stabilization and the gradual increase in household incomes have poached the part of their electorate from the "old left", and the results of the voting allegedly approved the socio-economic policy of the executive branch. In the 2000s, the voter preferred a capitalist course of development more than he did in the 1990s. The consolidation of the post-Soviet neo-nomenclature and the big bourgeoisie, which tended to merge into a single social stratum, the oligarchy, led to an attempt to form a "historical bloc" (in the Gramscian sense) in Ukraine, that is, to ensure the approval of the current system by the most numerous class – hired workers. Particularly in the case of Ukraine, this was supposed to be the support of the executive power to maintain the majority system of parliamentary elections.

Key words: cultural materialism, left, Ukrainian left, old left.

Introduction. Schools of socio-cultural anthropology, which dominated in North American science in the middle of the twentieth century, rested on idealistic theoretical and methodological principles. According to researcher of the history of anthropology in the US, S. Ortner, this led to the "lack <...> of a systematic sociology" [28, p. 132]. At the same time, researchers have already abandoned empiricism and descriptiveness inherent in the North American anthropology of the first half of the century, and favoured systematization and generalization. But in the theoretical constructions of symbolic anthropology, the sphere of culture was completely detached from other spheres of social life – economics, stratification, politics, etc. This raised legitimate criticism from the anthropologists inclined to materialistic methodology.

Presenting main material. The materialists tried to move from the interpretation of individual cases *ad hoc*, conditioned by the academic structure of American anthropology (in particular, the long-term field work carried out by young scientists on a particular social group [25, p. 48–50]), to the creation of some universal schemes. At the same time, they were cautious about the abundant workings of Marxism, which was explained by the then separateness of North American science from the continental European one, adherence to the empiricism of Anglo-Saxon humanitarianism and the political atmosphere of the McCarthy era [16, p. vi]. American materialists wanted to quantify their branch of knowledge: this attracted

their attention to natural, demographic, and technological factors, much more amenable to measurement than the *Gestalten* of symbolic anthropologists or Marxists dialectics [30, p. 135].

American anthropologist Marvin Harris (1927–2001) has tried to transfer the relevant findings of cultural ecologists of the 1950s to a new level, claiming to create a new scientific paradigm – cultural materialism.

M. Harris has proposed "systematic sociology" – a universal analytical scheme of the social order. Harris has simultaneously opposed modern Marxism, accusing it of political subjectivity, metaphysics, and even idealism, proclaiming himself "the right" interpreter and successor to Marx [12, p. 55–56]. The anthropologist replaces classical "basis-superstructure" scheme by "infrastructure-structure-superstructure" triad. Infrastructure combines the mode of production (technology of subsistence, techno-environmental relationships, ecosystems, work patterns) and mode of reproduction (demography, mating patterns, medical control of demographic patterns etc.). Structure covers domestic economy (family structure, domestic division of labour, domestic socialization, age and sex roles, etc.) and the political economy (political organization, division of labour, political socialization, class, urban / rural hierarchies, police / military control etc.). The superstructure, which Harris in later works calls "symbolic-ideational" element, includes kinship, political ideology, ethnic and national ideologies, religion, symbols, myths, aesthetic standards and philosophies, epistemologies, ideologies [12, p. 52–54].

If Marx's superstructure as a whole correlates with Harris's "superstructure," the "basis" is divided between "infrastructure" and "structure." And this was not just the whim of an American anthropologist. Harris hence sought to distinguish those measurable elements of social life (e.g., population size, the amount of natural resources being developed, the volume of production and consumption, the balance of foreign trade), from others (e.g., political structure, class division, international relations) objectively existing, scientifically visible, but much more complex subjects for unambiguous and conventional quantization. Harris criticizes the Marx's concept of "mode of production" for mixing material factors and subjective elements [12, p. 64, 220–221]. Also Harris calls attention to demographic factors ignored by Marxism [12, p. 66–70].

So, the infrastructure provided the scientist with demo-techno-econo-environmental variables, measured in man/hours, kilocalories, millimetres, tons, etc. According to Harris, these are the changes in infrastructure that determine the development of structure and superstructure (the principle of infrastructural determinism). Thus, the functional dependence of the less quantifiable and conventionally described elements of social life from elements that are easily measurable, less controversial, and are suitable for applying natural science methods is established (Harris calls the infrastructure "the principal interface between culture and nature"). Harris hoped that this would open the way for the nomologization and scientification of the humanitarian knowledge. At the same time, the American anthropologist wanted to preserve Marx's progressive intentions, but to get rid of the Marxist teleology, for which both Western and Soviet Marxists labelled him with "vulgar materialism." Harris was trying to "refurbish" materialism, which was relevant in the context of the tilt of Western Marxism in the direction of analysing culture and structuralism, and also turning Soviet Marxism, for the most part, into a quasi-scientific political tool.

However, cultural materialism, was a bit flawed too. Harris repeatedly stresses that infrastructural determinism does not deny the possibility of structure and superstructure to influence social evolution, but establishes a causal priority: the researcher should seek explanations in the infrastructure first, then in the structure and, at lastly, in the superstructure [12, p. 56]. In the classical works of Harris, this looks like an epistemological "safety net" from criticism, and the anthropologist himself is focused on finding out the infrastructural roots of any social phenomena and processes, in practice ignoring structural and superstructural determinism. But cultural materialism pretended to go beyond the traditional framework of socio-cultural anthropology and become a new paradigm for the social sciences – hence, to proceed from explaining individual phenomena and processes

to systems analysis. Attempts to implement the latter pushed late Harris and his students to a more serious attitude to the structural and superstructural forms of causal arrow, recognizing the possibility of "feedback" – the influence of ideology and social structure on the infrastructure [26]. This counterbalanced the model offered by cultural materialism, but neutralized its originality.

The purpose of this article is to check the relevance of the theoretical basis of cultural materialism, correlating it with our own analysis of the left segment of the Ukraine's political life during the period of independence. In this analysis, we tried to identify the infrastructural, structural, and superstructural factors that determined the dynamics of the political process, and also to clarify the causal priority between them. The next tasks will be to correlate the results with the theoretical constructs of cultural materialists. This will bring us closer to understanding the strengths and weaknesses of this research paradigm and will lead to the creation of a synthetic research program.

At the turn of the century, Ukraine was dogged by the political scandals, the West has featured growing recognition of the fact that post-Soviet milieu did not match "market and democracy" canons, allegedly instilled there during the 1990s. It contributed to the plummet of the transitological and some other theories, broadly used during the previous decades for explaining social evolution of the post-Soviet societies. Here, conceptual approaches of S. Levitsky and L. Way [24], K. Zimmer [33], D. Lane [23], H. van Zon [41], A. Swein [32], L. Shelley [31], L. King [10, p. 307–327], B. Greshkovits [10], M. Myant and J. Drahokoupil [27], J. Böröcz [3], C. Clarke [4], M. Upchurch [39], R. Dzarasov [7], as well as the works of Ukrainian researchers Yu. Yurchenko [47], O. Lyakh [32, p. 78–96], V. Mikhnenko, Z. Popovych [29] and D. Horbach [15] should be mentioned. The theoretical approaches used by the social science for analysing Ukrainian reality at the beginning of the 21st century belonged to the neoclassical sociology, institutionalism, world system analysis, and neo-Marxism. As sociologist Dergunov noticed, theories of the next generation might appear on the ground of the best achievements of the non-Marxist and Marxist dependency theories [5, p. 51].

The peak of scientific interest in the Ukrainian left was attained at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. A considerable amount of literature has been published on the issue. The greatest foreign specialist is British political scientist A. Wilson, who focused mainly on party building processes, ideological transformation, and the electoral base of Ukrainian parliamentary leftists (that is, CPU, SPU, SelPU, PSPU) [43; 44; 45]. The most extensive work was prepared by a team of Ukrainian researchers within the framework of the National Institute for Strategic Studies – a monograph by O. Haran, O. Maiboroda, A. Tkachuk, V. Khmelko "Ukrainian Left:

Between Leninism and Social-Democracy" [11]. They have analysed most of Ukraine's left-wing political forces and tried to fit them into the ruling national-state discourse, providing certain forecasts and recommendations. Additional attention could be given to the exploration of V. Khmelko, who dealt with the relationship between the transformations of the social structure of Ukraine's population and its political preferences [20]. However, during the 2000s, interest in Ukrainian issues has fallen markedly. In the West, postcommunist studies have lost their topicality, in Ukraine, the interest had dissipated too, as the parliamentary leftists were sidelined [25, p. 88-90]. The decline of the "old left" has intensified the activities of the so-called "new left." We mean the research work of sociologist V. Ishchenko, who has very critically analysed the activities of Ukraine's left political parties, introduced into the broad context of the political struggle, applied the class approach, and all this was supported by a careful analysis of statistical data [18; 19].

The studios focused on those aspects, which are most significant for the researcher. In the case of E. Wilson, this is a post-communist transformation to Western liberal-democratic models, for the National Institute for Strategic Studies – the attitude of left-wing parties to state independence and the national question, the relation with certain ethnolinguistic groups, and for Ishchenko – the internal dynamics of party development and their involvement in the protest activity.

In the 1990s, the "market's invisible hand" has directed the independent republic to precisely the opposite direction from what market reforms supporters have expected. The deep economic crisis was the result of a synergistic interaction of several factors: the negative tendencies of the late Soviet economy; features of the transit period; the destruction of inter-republican commodity chains; the inclusion of Ukraine in the world market under the conditions created by the "First World", the formation of a class society with the original accumulation of capital inherent to the bourgeoisie.

What happened within the infrastructure milieu? The economy of Ukraine was experiencing a full-blown depression. Production of goods and services has significantly reduced, resulting in the 55% GDP fall in 1991–1999 [35]. For comparison, during the years of the Great Depression, which struck the United States in 1929–1933, the GDP drop was twice lower. Especially critical was the situation with the industry – industrial production declined by 48% during this period [36].

Some high-tech industries that produce high value-added products – microelectronics, machine tools, instrument engineering – have almost collapsed. Consequently, the structure of industry has shifted towards an increase in the share of semi-finished products manufacture (steel, chemicals, and food products). Thus, the share of mechanical engineering and metal processing

fell from 31.3% to 13.4%, while steelmaking increased from 11.2% to 27%, agriculture suffered a slightly lower but also significant decline (-44%) [14]. In 1991 the number of employed in industry exceeded the number of employed in agriculture by 1.6 times, but in 1997 these indicators equalled, and as of 2001, 1.3 times more people worked in agriculture than in industry. We could talk about the transition from the industrial economy to the industrial-agrarian one, and development of the natural economy (gardens, cottages, household plots) indicated an even deeper regression. Relative growth was observed only in the service sector [20, p. 2]. Significant structural changes have taken place in the field of foreign trade. During 1995–2000, the share of CIS countries decreased in Ukrainian exports (from 52.7% to 33.3%), and imports (from 64.5% to 33.7%) [17].

Soviet ruling elite has been enjoying a number of economic privileges, but it could only control the means of production, without possessing them. During the 1990s, the distribution of public property took place. However, privatization in Ukraine has stalled; the semi-owners, heads of state enterprises have illegally assigned part of the profits [32, p. 7–8]). This process gave birth to the new ruling class – the bourgeoisie. Its members included representatives of the ruling groups of the Ukrainian SSR (party nomenclature, "red directors"), partially Soviet "middle class" (intellectuals, officials), and organized crime representatives that arose during the years of Perestroika. Petty bourgeoisie could be considered as a separate class, which receives certain profits from business, professional activity or corrupt rent, but do not use the hired labour [38, p. 85].

The vast majority of Ukraine's population of working age remained hired workers. The share of the social supplementary product received by wage workers has significantly decreased, which means that this class has lost during the structural changes in the 1990s. The share of wages in GDP declined from 58.8% in 1990 to 45% in the early 2000's. Real wages in 1999 amounted to about 30% of the 1990 figures. In 1999, the salary arrears amounted to 7.2 billion UAH. The fall in real wages outpaced the rate of GDP decline; labour productivity reached 23% during the study period [42], redistribution of social wealth in favour of the new-born bourgeoisie resulted in a decline in quality of life.

Virtually all the economic indicators have deteriorated during the 1990s. The "old left" has brought economic issues to the forefront and called for the establishment of social justice and welfare of the ordinary citizens. Furthermore, the "old left" acted as the only structural opposition, underlining its connection with the Soviet regime, which, for all its setbacks, has left successful examples of Ukraine's economic modernization [44, p. 23].

Left parties became pioneers in the number of deputies ramrodded through the single-man-

date constituencies in 1994. We did not take into account the president's election of the same year, as the candidate from the largest left-wing political force (CPU) did not participate in it. After the parliamentary elections of 1998, which took place under a mixed system, the left increased their presence in Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada. In the first round of the presidential elections of October 31, 1999, candidates from CPU, SPU, and PSPU received a total of 8% more votes than Leonid Kuchma [44, p. 21]

Consequently, under the conditions of the economic depression of the 1990's, Ukrainian left parties steadily have increased electoral success, but could not gain the "critical weight" of the votes to get a stable majority in parliament or to obtain a presidential post.

Why mass economic frustration did not bring to power the left critics of the then economic policy? The reasons should be found beyond the limits of purely infrastructural quantitative changes. As part of this article, we can only outline them in the most general terms.

First, let us pay attention to the electoral system. Verkhovna Rada deputies were elected by the majority system in 1994, and in 1998, mixed majoritarian-proportional system was applied. In the late 1990's, the left-wing political forces advocated transition to a proportional election system, while the ruling circles defended the majoritarian component of the mixed system. The results of the 1998 parliamentary elections by majoritarian districts and party lists were strikingly different (see Table 1).

Of even greater importance in country's political life was nationalism (or rather, nationalisms). The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the collapse of the Soviet identity, which contained elements of the class consciousness, state patriotism, and supranationalism. In Ukraine, the titular nation is a rather heterogeneous entity, in which several sub-ethnic elements could be singled out. The two poles of this continuum were Galician "conscious Ukrainians" and "Soviet people" of Donbas. During the 90's, the former were the electorate of the People's Movement, while the latter were Communist Party supporters [44, p. 35].

Since the 2002 parliamentary elections, the "old left" have been obtaining fewer votes and reduced their presence in the Verkhovna Rada [37]. The duction of their "political weight" in the 2000's was faster than its growth in the 1990's. Economic stabiliza-

tion and the gradual increase in household incomes have poached some part of the left electorate away. However, GDP growth and real incomes are not sufficient to reduce the electoral support of the political opposition. During the 2nd cadence of Leonid Kuchma (November 1999 – January 2005), Ukraine had the highest GDP growth rate over the years of its independence [35], but in the national elections of 2002 and 2004, better candidates from the right-liberal national-democratic (with elements of social-populism) opposition have demonstrated better results [37]. In the 2000s, the voter more often preferred the capitalist course of the country's development than the voter of the 1990s, which projected from the stabilization and gradual restoration of infrastructure indicators in the sphere of the political life. In 2003, the real average wage returned to the level of 1991, and the level of the last "pre-stagflation" 1990 year was reached only in 2008, the last year of the economic boom [15, p. 178]. At this background, the post-1991 way of life seemed much more applicable than the return to the Soviet system (as proposed by CPU, PSPU) or the transition of Ukraine to the blurred "third way" (as offered by SPU). But in the framework of a market economy and parliamentary democracy, the voter wanted to support someone else, not highly corrupt, functioning elite.

The fall of the electoral support of the "old left" began not in 2002, when this could be clearly explained by the influence of infrastructure changes, but earlier – during the 2nd round of the presidential election in 1999. Kuchma's victory in the 2nd round could be described in terms of structure and the superstructure, but let us not forget that Donetsk region, CPU's traditional electoral outpost, gave him the largest increments of votes between the rounds [37]. In the first round (turnout - 66%) Kuchma received here 778 104 votes (32%), losing to Symonenko (39.4%). In the 2nd round (turnout – 78.9%), Kuchma gained 1 557 340 of votes (52.5%), while his competitor had 41.23%. In Luhansk region, Symonenko defeated Kuchma in both rounds (47.2%/28.6%, 53.9%/40.7%). This significant difference in electoral behaviour (volatility) of the regions, extremely close by their socio-economic and ethno-national characteristics, could be explained with another structural factor – the class. In the 1990's, one of the main centres of formation of Ukraine's bourgeoisie was Donetsk region (together with Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv); this bourgeoisie has actively helped the president to be re-elected and to retain his class power and its foundation – ownership of the means of production and access to corrupt rents.

Results of the Left at the general elections

	1994	1998 (party lists)	1998 (majority constituency)	1999 (1 round of presidential elections)
CPU	23.5%	24.7%	16.4%	22.2%
SPU	3.5%	8.6%	2.2%	11.3%
SelPU	4.4%			-
PSPU	-	4%	0.9%	11%
In total	31.4%	37.3%	19.5%	44.5%

Donetsk faction of the bourgeoisie has actively used all the means to bring Kuchma to the victory in the 2nd round [47, p. 112] – backstopping (informal agitation, pressure, bribery through non-patrimonial networks based on large industrial enterprises), and direct falsifications recorded by the OSCE [32, p. 74; 25]. Donetsk bourgeoisie had lesser influence on the neighbouring Luhansk region; this led to a striking difference in the results of the vote.

At the turn of the century, the class power of the great bourgeoisie has strengthened in a political dimension. In April 2000, Kuchma called a referendum, aimed on amending the constitution, increasing the president's powers, and introducing an upper chamber. After losing in the parliamentary and legal fields, in 2001–2002, the left opposition was forced to reach an agreement with the liberal opposition and move to more decisive counter-measures, in particular the organization of street protests. The president and the great bourgeoisie hoped that pro-presidential political forces, "For a united Ukraine!" bloc, would win the parliamentary elections. Donetsk bourgeoisie has again provided the highest results in Donetsk and Sumy region [32, p. 75]. But despite the economic growth and total domination of pro-government discourse in the media [6, p. 17–42] opposition parties and blocs took 76% of the seats in the multi-mandate constituency [37]. However, thanks to majoritarianists, the pro-presidential majority was formed in the Verkhovna Rada of IV convocation.

During 2003–2004, it enabled privatization of the large-scale enterprises, primarily in export-oriented metallurgical and chemical industries, whose profitability in the conditions of the current foreign market situation sharply increased. [47, p. 115–116]. Western capital was explicitly eliminated from the privatization process. Some authoritarian tendencies and Kolchuga scandal in 2002 exacerbated the US and EU dissatisfaction with Ukraine's ruling circles and increased the level of support they provided to the right-wing opposition [45, p. 114].

The consolidation of the post-Soviet neo-nomenclature and bourgeoisie, which tended to merge into a single social stratum, the oligarchy, led to an attempt of forming a "historical bloc" (in Gramscian sense [47, pp. 51]), that is, to ensure the approval of the current system within the most numerous class – the hired workers. The non-privileged classes now receive somewhat more public benefits, which, according to the plan, would ensure their political, social and economic loyalty. However, the increase of social standards required a significant increase in budget expenditures and, accordingly, a better filling of the budget, while a significant part of Ukrainian economy was "grey" (in 2004 – about 28% of GDP [34]). But the great bourgeoisie has turned tax evasion into one of the main sources of primary accumulation of capital [47, p. 42, 93]. The 2004 presidential elections were

at hand, and the tax burden was shifted to small entrepreneurs and self-employed persons (12.5% of the economically active population of Ukraine) [2, p. 135]. But the middle and petty bourgeoisie have mobilized politically, spreading the anti-trust and the support of the opposition forces. Business preferred to focus not on the left opposition, but on the right-wing liberals.

The economic growth of the early 2000's was based on the growth of prices and demand for domestic metal and chemicals. The production cycles of those industries were concentrated mainly in the south-east of Ukraine. In these regions, real incomes grew faster than in the others. [2, p. 136]. Consequently, the export-raw material nature of the economic recovery has led to an increase in regional polarization and an increase in nationalist sentiment. Reduction of social tension in Ukraine's industrial regions was corrosive to the social base of CPU; its electorate reconstituted itself into the oligarchic camp ("For a united Ukraine," later – "Party of Regions"), which became a hallmark of the political life of the 2000s. [32, p. 39].

According to Yu. Yurchenko, the bourgeoisie (oligarchs and "clans") is not homogeneous; this young class suffers from the internal struggle for means of production, access to corrupt rents and political levers [47, p. 30]. The seeming compromise of the early 2000s has been camouflaged by the competing bourgeoisie factions. Thus, Pinchuk's Interpipe Group had the best positions among Dnipropetrovsk groups, Akhmetov's System Capital Management had the most of benefits among other Donetsk groups, and Kolomoisky's Privat and Taruta's Industrial Union of Donbas had somewhat worse positions. The latter were part of Kuchma's oligarch system, but received a smaller portion of the "cake," which American geographer D. Harvey called "accumulation by dispossession" (this can be seen from the results of the "big privatization" 2003–2004). These bourgeoisie factions did not openly break with Kuchma's regime, but maintained financing its political ties with the opposition. [47, p. 112–118].

In the protest activity of the early 2000s, the left-wing parties should rely on the various forms of proletariat, but the political activity of this part of Ukrainian society was rather low. The labour movement, trade unions and the old left parties decline was a long-term global trend, whose roots could be found in the economic crisis of the early 1970's and the "conservative turn" [40, p. 202–205]. In the social camp, the outbreak of working activity of the late 1980s and early 1990s was replaced by the atomization of labour under capitalism [32, p. 65–68]. Ukraine's "yellow" Federation of Trade Unions has preserved enormous material base, which allowed to effectively carry out the role of the ruling regime's "driving pass" and to keep the working class from self-organization and subsequent partial politicization [22, p. 614–618].

In such conditions, the “old left” gets involved in a political struggle where oligarchs, right-liberal and nationalist politicians also participated. At that time, the left parties had a solid political weight, but still played secondary roles. During the Orange Revolution of 2004, they were “from both sides of the fence:” the SPU, adhering the logic of the struggle against Kuchma as a union of the ruling elite and leading FIGs, entered the “orange” camp, while the Communist Party left a coalition with right-liberals, striving to keep the popularity among its own electorate in the conditions of spreading nationalist sentiments among the broad masses of Ukraine. In order not to lose votes in favour of the Party of Regions, the CPU has entered into an alliance with the Party of Regions.

Having adopted the logic of this political struggle, the left parties quickly found themselves in within the rump. The new, “orange” government has embarked on massive transformations, including the reprivatisation of large industries and the removal of barriers for foreign capital, but failed to arrive at a capitalist class fractional rivalry [47, c. 99]. During the 2006 crisis, the SPU tried to maintain its independence by manoeuvring between the “orange” and “white-blue” bourgeoisie factions, but in the face of polarization of the society and the spread of the nationalist sentiment, this led to the discrediting of the party, the loss of its electoral base in Central Ukraine, failing to overcome the threshold in the 2007 elections, and the further split of the socialists. This experience has probably encouraged the Communist Party to keep its position of the Party of Regions “satellite” not to escape from big politics. The financial crisis of 2008 resumed the economic recession, which was reflected in the results of the 2012 parliamentary elections, but at that time the “old left” were no longer able to pursue an independent policy and relied on a neo-liberal course the government.

In the context of the possibility of applying the theoretical and methodological principles of cultural materialism for the analysis of the development of modern Ukraine, it is worth recalling Harris’s article on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, published in 1992 [13]. The author has rightly observed that the roots of this historical phenomenon lay in the economy. But the infrastructural changes (the decline in productivity, the deterioration of the ecological situation, man-made disasters, technological backwardness) took place not due to some immanent objective laws of nature and technology, but because social institutions and actors failed to increase productivity, to avoid environmental pollution, technogenic catastrophes, and to introduce hi-tech innovations. The next step in scientific analysis might be the search for infrastructural reasons for the peculiarities of the Soviet structure. In other words, social institutions and actors were such, and not the others, and it could be predetermined by the infrastructure. This smacks of economic determinism,

Harris does not take such a step in his analysis, and if he did, he would apparently resort to a world-system analysis (authoritarianism and rigidity of Soviet social structures were predetermined by the scarcity of resources, which in turn is conditioned by some position in the world-system). This again would bring cultural materialism closer to other materialistic directions.

Conclusions. Our analysis of the Ukrainian society after 1991 revealed similar trends in the cultural-materialistic approach. Infrastructure changes certainly had some direct impact on the political processes (e.g., the growing popularity of the anti-market opposition in the 1990s and the decline in its clout in the 2000s), but with their help it is not possible to explain these processes in their integrity. Firstly, changes in the social and political structure of Ukrainian society rather predetermined changes in infrastructure, and not vice versa. For example, the primary accumulation of capital by a new-born Ukrainian bourgeoisie was the reason for the massive delays in wages to the proletariat, which reduced its purchasing power and thus accelerated the collapse of the economy. In turn, the features of the post-communist bourgeoisie could be explained with the help of class analysis of the societies of “real socialism” and studying the position of these countries in the world-system. This goes beyond the framework of cultural materialism in its classical form, but it seems to us adequate. In this article, we did not seek to resolve the long-standing dispute between Marvin Harris and structural Marxists about the causal priority of the infrastructure or structure. We just want to note that the analysis of Ukraine’s political life on a “short time” scale indicates the primacy of structural factors, in particular class agency. However, as for some longer periods of social evolution, the ratio might be different.

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Дослідницька стратегія культурного матеріалізму: кейс українських лівих на рубежі століть

Бідочко Леся Ярославівна

аспірант кафедри політології
Докторської Школи
Національного університету
«Києво-Могилянська академія»
вул. Волоська, 8/5, Київ, Україна

Мета статті – перевірити релевантність теоретичних основ культурного матеріалізму, зіставити її з нашим власним аналізом лівого сегменту політичного життя України в період незалежності. Ми намагалися окреслити інфраструктурні, структурні та надструктурні чинники, що визначали динаміку політичного процесу, а також з'ясувати причинний пріоритет, який існує між ними. На загальнонаціональних виборах 1994, 1998 та 1999 років ліві партії продемонстрували вражаючі результати й певну позитивну динаміку. Після парламентських виборів 2002 року вони отримували щоразу менше голосів і скоротили свою присутність у Верховній Раді. У 2000-х роках зниження «політичної ваги» лівих було більш інтенсивним, ніж її зростання в 1990-х роках. Економічна стабілізація та поступове збільшення доходів домогосподарств відвернули частину їхнього електорату від «старих лівих», а результати голосування нібито затверджували соціально-економічну політику виконавчої влади. У 2000-х роках, на відміну від 1990-х, виборець надавав перевагу капіталістичному шляху розвитку. Злиття пострадянської неонеменклатури та великої буржуазії вилилося в єдиний соціальний шар – олігархію, і це призвело до спроби сформувати в Україні «історичний блок» (у грамшанському ключі), щоб забезпечити затвердження наявної системи найбільш численним класом. Зрештою під час «Помаранчевої революції» 2004 р. вони опинилися «по різні боки барикад»: СПУ, залишаючись вірною логіці боротьби проти кучмізму як зрощення владної верхівки та провідних ФПГ, увійшла до «помаранчевого» табору, тоді як КПУ залишила коаліцію з праволібералами, прагнучи в умовах поширення націоналістичних настроїв серед широких мас населення України зберегти популярність серед власного електорату, іншими словами, щоб не втрачати голоси на користь Партії регіонів, КПУ вступила в альянс з Партією регіонів.

Ключові слова: культурний матеріалізм, ліві, українські ліві, старі ліві.