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PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS OF MAX SCHELER AND JEAN-PAUL SARTRE AS TWO “PROJECTS” IN A COMMON PARADIGM

Relevance of the article. The article presents a comparative analysis of the theoretical heritage of the most prominent representatives of phenomenological thought, related to considering extremely complex issues of the entire humanities, namely, the issue of the affective nature of human beings. The analysis' relevance is determined by the current crisis of emotional life that makes us increasingly draw special attention to transcendental-phenomenological theory of emotions, closely associated, primarily, with such authors as Max Scheler and Jean-Paul Sartre who are known to have made significant progress on this issue.

The purpose of the article is to reveal the essential meanings (patterns) of what is usually called affective culture, which was conceptually represented in the phenomenological theory of emotions by the above authors to emphasize its artificiality, therefore the existing gap (discrepancy') between ideals of feelings and real emotional life.

Research methods. The methodological basis of this study is mostly comparative analysis, supplemented by a hermeneutic approach, and critical analysis, inherent in philosophical discourse *per se*, as well as employing common principles of scientific investigation, such as synthesis and generalization.

Research results. Reviewing the phenomenological theory of emotions of Scheler and Sartre allows us to rediscover the whole paradox of philosophical thinking, which consists in an amazing awareness of the true origins of affective advancing even from the standpoint of the phenomenological approach (which is known to reject any metaphysical explanation) and at the same time an equally amazing awareness of its almost complete failure in real emotional life.

The phenomenology of emotions is particularly interesting, especially when we try to compare it with a whole range of other studies, mainly, for example, with psychoanalytic approach, and especially when we talk about Sartre. As was discovered in this review, Sheler successfully combined phenomenological analysis, metaphysics and sociocultural arguments in his *ordo amoris* theory, whereas Sartre's existential phenomenology has proved to be more objective and revealing, presumably consonant with psychoanalytic criticism.

Key words: affective culture, affective pattern, emotional values, love relationships, *ordo amoris*, phenomenology of emotions, phenomenological ontology of consciousness.

Introduction. The issue of elucidating the true origins of emotional life, as well as understanding to what extent it determines and affects the development of the personality, which in philosophical discourse is associated with collocation “the designing of the Subject”, is a key issue of the entire humanities, related to contemporary anthropology.

Despite the whole complexity of the above question, it is needed to say that in the early 20th century and until the current moment substantiation the decisive influence of fundamental social institutions on psyche has rooted in many scientific sources.

In relation to the above, arose a concept of *affective culture* is not considered any more as an effect of self-activity of the transcendental subject, rather conversely, it is perceived in terms of specific emotive development or, *vice versa*, decadence or “fading” of socio-significant feelings and emotions, starting with the feeling of shame (embarrassment) and ending with the ability for love.

Further, due to the studies of structuralists, human emotional life became associated with the concepts of emotional or affective patterns and threshold of feelings that are currently used widely in sociocultural explorations. To put it another way, contemporary humanitarian and anthropological science obtained a new concept, namely the concept of *affective patterns*, focusing largely on fundamental human emotions and feelings such as *love, humor, shame, repugnance*, etc., considered in the social context. According to most examiners these “patterns” are absolutely relative structures of mental activity, determined largely by certain historical and sociocultural conditions.

Suffice it to mention, at least, the so-called *sociogenetic approach* to the study of human emotions (Norbert Elias), which explains their conditioning by different social and cultural circumstances. More precisely, the *sociogenetic approach* allows us to consider emotional life from the angle of its advancement or, conversely, its “decomposition” in close correlation with social-structural changes. This approach in modern humanities has given rise to a whole field of knowledge called Sociology of Emotions, which is thought to have had decisive influence on many scientific trends and methodologies of the 20th century.

At first glance, the disadvantage of the above approach is associated with limitation to a certain social experience. Almost all representatives of the aforementioned methodology apply the term *affective pattern*, and in some places, even *emotion code* with the aim to emphasize determinacy, therefore the relativity of people's emotional life.

In this context, we have every right to use the term of *ordo amoris*, which was introduced by prominent representative of phenomenology, namely by Max Scheler. This concept can be completely associated with *emotional code* of one or another human community. As Max Sheler rightly remarked, the *ordo amoris* can be discussed in relation to both a human personality and any historical epoch, family, people or nation [5].

In this regard the question arises, in what way can phenomenology be combined with the above social determinism? In addition, can phenomenology limit at all the relativism that prevails in modern studies of emotions, and which is related to another, no less prominent representative of it, namely Jean-Paul Sartre?

So, this study aims to find out the main advantages of phenomenological thought concerning the issue of the nature of human emotions, especially those affective structures, which are closely related to human relationships.

It is well known that the phenomenological heritage of Scheler has found a compelling embodiment in his concept of *ordo amoris*. What is it? Answering this question, Sheler explains that it is primarily some kind of order of love and hatred, the form (type) constitution of these passions which dominate and predominate in a certain social layer, becoming a model of relationships. We can even assume *their potential to have a certain structure* or even schema – that is, a system-wide character [1,7].

At first glance, in his reflections on the basic *emotional values* of humanity, namely, about *love* and *hatred*, Scheler is mostly confined by the descriptive analysis that it is not surprising, since he is known to be a vivid representative of phenomenological philosophy. So, analysis of any correlation between the individual's mental structure and sociocultural determinants here seems to be irrelevant.

But, analyzing the main affective opposition, Scheler pays most attention to *patterning of love*, which, in his deep conviction, involves a set of ethical requirements (restraints) that compose its transcendental structure, perhaps, since he is clearly aware of the whole complexity of cultural

modeling or patterning of hatred. Scheler believes that love is the most relevant value for humans despite its constant dependence on human desire and will: *because of ability to love, humans live and exist morally*. As a phenomenologist, Scheler examines love from the angle of elucidating its eidetic structure, which (in his opinion) is a particular marker of the metaphysical origin of the human soul. In other words, according to this doctrine, this emotion is eternal – the most common human value that hardly undergoes any essential transformations.

The thinker insists on the metaphysical perspectives of human love. What exactly does he have in mind? Scheler explains the metaphysical perspectives of love, which consist above all in its spiritual, that is *transcendental nature, which idealizes people and inspires them to perfection*, as well as gives deep satisfaction from life to the one who loves. Since only spiritual love is personal love, which allows love to be moral, discovering in personality the ability to move in the direction of value self-perfection.

Therefore, he is being completely within the framework of the Christian paradigm in terms of considering love as a pure moral concept, as an effect of self-perfection by humans in their effort to comply with ideals, and in this vision, Scheler is not alone.

It is known such a view is largely caused by the entire Christian ethos (spirit), which has had an influence on philosophy and even on skeptical psychoanalysis, where human love is traditionally *elevated to the rank of moral value*.

Along with that, Scheler acknowledges the importance of individual potentially relevant attitudes, sympathy, and antipathy. Individual emotional order, which can also be classified as a certain pattern of sympathy or antipathy, is largely determined, as he believes, by so-called primary value objects of love at an early age. This may be a hint of the Oedipus complex, which has been revealed to have a deep emotional foundation. But the further familiarizing himself with his *ordo amoris* testifies that Scheler least of all tends to discuss the above matter in psychological terms, particularly, in terms of human passions.

The phenomenologist deliberately refuses to discuss the *ordo amoris* in a psychoanalytic context, namely, he states about his overlooking of the psychic and organic characteristics, and phenomena that follow them, inasmuch they are different from love and destroy it, but they are, to a greater extent inherent in man. For him love is, primarily, *a tendency* or, respectively, already an *act that tries to direct each thing in the direction of its value perfection*.

Scheler's *ordo amoris* theory is very similar to the metaphysics of Spengler's culture, inasmuch he applies such concepts as "destiny", "scheme", etc. in relation to the basic characteristics of what he calls *ordo amoris* or *ethos*. But in the case of Scheler's reasoning, we clearly see the calls for the identification of the "gestalt" of a particular affective *ethos* – its basic moral formula-ordo, since every personality and every culture should be certainly subject to a clearly defined morality.

For Scheler love is, primarily, the tendency to perfection, but it is mostly *the opportunity to participate in other beings*, i.e., an act of detachment from oneself and one's own states, one's own contents of consciousness, *transcending them to possibility of the experience of the world*. It is this ability of humans that expresses a high sense of love with its moral meaning: love always implies the act of idealization of a beloved, but simultaneously it is the desire to comply with the ideal image in the mind of a loving person: to be better than you really are.

Such a philosophy does not even consider a situation in which a person loves when the beloved is not at all striving for perfection. In other words, the person you love may not be willing to comply with his ideal image above. That is the reason why Scheler insists on the true meaning of love or *true love as opposed to false*, i.e., when a person aspires to perfect "things", which always implies idealization in relationships. Therefore, in this theory we can observe enhancing "cultural" argument because of employing the concept of *true (right) ordo amoris* – *when someone loves something that really worthy of love*.

Results and discussion. So, following the above reasoning, it turns out that not all things or people may be loved, but only those *who are chosen, that is, worthy*. Furthermore, people usually love not "things", but rather their "types" – and these types, which in any case are the types of values

that attract people everywhere – according to the constant rules of preferences (or aversions). In this attraction and repulsion there is a certain *ordo amoris*, which in Scheler's view determines the human *destiny*.

It is felt the metaphysical bias of all his reasoning, especially when Scheler addresses the question about the possible *disorder* in human character, that essentially means the absence of *integral human personality* – the personality, who symbolizes the meeting-coincidence with the Deity. According to Scheler, complexity of such destiny is her actual decomposition.

As for hatred, indeed, when considering it in abstract terms, then Scheler is right: it is, primarily, a deep emotional negation of the value of something, which is rather the effect of incorrect, disordered love [5]. But at the same time, this sentence seems rather questionable, because we deal with a more complex phenomenon, with the complexity of destructive human impulses in general, to which hatred belongs. *The pattern of hatred roots in rejection of love as such, rather than in a simple act of negation or devaluation of someone inherent in contempt*. Presumably, it is an acute reaction to the offending of love, related to human selfishness.

Indeed, the so-called disordered love in terms of affective attachment or obsession can easily turn into hatred. But not everyone is capable of loving in principle. The emotional attitude to life of people who harbor hatred is obvious, but in this emotionality one feeling is not always determined by the opposite urge, just as love for one person does not always presuppose hatred for another.

Nevertheless, when it comes to love itself, we must recognize the above contradiction, perfectly described by Sartre. This is, essentially, the nature of any passion, which Scheler refuses to discuss, since he more focuses on moral love – not even on *attachments*, but only on concern with the worthy “objects”, that is, with those, which comply with a certain moral ideal.

When reflecting on hatred, he defines it in the context only clash of values – as a kind of negative reaction to violation or prohibition of one's values, which are significant for a person or a few persons. Although hate does mean not only some hostility or denial, but also a powerful impulse of hostility and denial (negation) expressed in the desire for the death of a hated person. The latter is a passion that can completely absorb the consciousness of an individual. *Just as love is the aspiration to the absolute affirmation of a chosen object in being*, hatred is the opposite – the aspiration to its absolute negation and destruction.

But the subject matter of Scheler's consideration most likely corresponds to a culturally constructed pattern: the thinker prefers “sublime Christian and romantic love of souls”, despite his recognition of the influence of heredity and destiny in this matter. For this reason, love here cannot be regarded either as passion or affection. Meanwhile, is Scheler right in saying that hatred should be subsumed to the range of human values?

If we admit the above presupposition, therefore we must admit that hatred is a component of human culture, that obviously cannot be correct, inasmuch hatred is not subject to evolutionary refinement. More precisely, human aggressiveness (violence) advances, whereas hatred should be considered as its psychic resource, which, additionally, depends on the type of personality. Therefore, hatred is always determined by the individual psyche, but simultaneously, it may be under the power of “channeling” in accordance with the general spirit of one or another community.

But Scheler writes about the ranked relationships of values inherent in each culture, based on the existence of a number of conventional views on *what exactly is worthy of love* and what is not, that is, what is worthy of hatred; therefore, he admits the conditionality of emotions as well as their relativity that brings his views closer to the poststructuralists.

It appears entirely to most contemporary thinkers that our emotions are “channelizing” just like our desires, being constantly under the direct influence of the whole social system. It is this system that orders us exactly what we should and shouldn't love. But despite this, Scheller believes we should love “things” which have absolute value, that is, which can only be spiritual and morally perfect.

Thus, taking this theory as an example, we have a very interesting methodological combination. Humanistic background of Sheler's philosophy is to with his firm believe in the spiritual purpose of

love, that is, human heart is primarily aimed at love, rather than hatred; therefore, love urge is primary or prime relation to being (it's amazing but Sartre spoke the same view).

As far as Sartre is concerned, he focuses more on real love relationships and corresponding experiences, which he mostly calls “existential”, mediated by extremely tragic world attitude. In contrast to Scheler, he has no intention *at all to examine them in terms of moral values or “patterning”*. If there is any sense in speaking about their “metaphysical” foundations, then they can be associated only with the central structure of human consciousness, namely, with the structure of “Ego”, which is hardly to be clarified clearly.

To put it another way, this structure is the transcendental core of human personality and, at the same time, the most complex question for the entire philosophical grasp. But despite Sartre's adherence to phenomenology, he has no tendency to consider consciousness with his Ego as a source of “transcendental constitution of the world”.

The direct purpose of *phenomenological ontology of consciousness* is to analyze the emotional experience of man in his tragic confrontation with the outside world, related with the structure of Ego, which in this context, can be *seen as an existential manifestation of the narcissistic “ego instinct” discovered by Freud*. But this is only an assumption. Despite Sartre's analysis of love relationships in psychoanalytic terms of masochism and sadism, for example, he, nevertheless, avoids any reference to psychoanalysis.

Sartre also believes that love and hate are profound manifestations of human nature, but which ones exactly? And what is the advantage of his theory of emotions over Scheler's?

When we try to answer this question, we need to briefly reproduce the basic logic of his reflections, proposed by him in his outstanding “Being and Nothingness”, where Sartre insists that *love is, primarily, the striving for transcending one's own consciousness, aimed at assimilating the consciousness of the Other*, because “the lover does not desire to possess the beloved as one possess a thing; he demands a special type of appropriation. He wants to possess freedom as freedom” [3, p. 365]. This is the most common definition of love, or it is precisely the main project of love if we consider this experience from the perspective of existential phenomenology. But what does this “assimilating” or “appropriation” mean in fact?

Although *love initially creates the impression of attributing an absolute value to the Other*, i.e., to the beloved regardless of who he or she is as a person, as it turns out later, this attitude is based on the aspiration to be an absolute value for beloved on the part of lover. All this turns love into quite dramatic relationships between two consciousnesses or “freedoms”, since, according to Sartre, an essential trait of consciousness is freedom of its constructing activity.

Since love might be seen as a relationship between the two consciousnesses that make up its essence, it is an existential category rather than a transcendental one. But what kind of relationship is that?

Sartre expresses complete certainty: *it is such interpersonal relations, where, in fact, each of the above-mentioned consciousnesses seeks to recognize the absolute value of its personality in the Other*, since for himself the lover demands to be “the unique and privileged occasion”, “to be the whole world for the beloved...” and “if this end could be attained, I would result in the first place in my being secure withing the Other's consciousness” [3, p. 369]. But this is not possible in principle.

The forementioned dramatism is complicated by the very structure of human “existence”, namely its corporal determinacy, which, according to Sartre, is no less significant reason for the failure of the love project. For Sartre love is not at all the joy of coexistence with the Other (as, for example, Heidegger believed).

Primarily, “my being-for-other” always exists as a “body”. It means that I am given to the Other in his prime experience of me as an “object”, not a “subject” or consciousness. On the contrary, he experiences all of this with me. But in my love project I try to completely assimilate his consciousness in terms of the desire to be an absolute value for him, because he is an absolute value for me. With aim of accomplishing this project I must make him to be clear to me, i.e., there is need to take

someone else's point of view in relation to myself, or "the problem for me is to make myself be by acquiring the possibility of taking the Other's point of view on myself" [3, p. 365].

But I am not able to accomplish the above, since the beloved always appears in front of me as a body, that is, as some "object" (just like me), his consciousness for me, like my consciousness for him, is non-transparent. I do not know what he really thinks of me, in what way he does look at me, evaluates etc. "God know who I am for him? God knows what he makes me be?" in ahis absolute freedom. It is from this fact that stems from my constant "uneasiness" and "anxiety" concerning love, which sooner or later will break the charm Other and perhaps even will cause hatred in these relations.

Thus, for both Sheler and Sartre love is exclusively "spiritual" narrative. But, according to French existentialist, love relationships are poisoned by human Ego with its striving to establish himself that is essentially narcissistic, and by the non-transparency of the consciousness of the Other because of his factuality. It is this human Ego (a fundamental affective value and care) with its striving to establish Self, with its constitutive freedom that is the basic value of human experience of relationships with other people or social surroundings. Kirkegaard called such an attitude "extremist egoism doing a dreadful thing one's own sake" [2, p. 35]. In conditions, when "existence" takes such a project, he or she negates the very idea of love. As Sartre concludes, consciousnesses remain in solitude, each with its own freedom.

It is obvious that love is seen here in terms of human passions, that is, from the perspective of another mental structure: Sartre refers to *Ego or selfishness of humans, rather than human morality*, despite his adherence to transcendental analysis, which does not allow subjectivity in this matter. In contrast to Scheler's views, *Sartre sees in love neither an aspiration for the ideal, nor even less a sense of guilt*: after all, it is always a flow of passions revolving around human Ego and his desire for Himself.

Conclusions. So, we have here two brilliant representatives of phenomenological thought, even though their views on the nature of basic human feelings are so divergent. As we have seen, Scheler considers *idealization* a constant feature of love, because it implies ascribing to the beloved aesthetic and ethical qualities, to which he or she may not correspond, whereas Sartre insists on an act of *absolutization* in terms of attributing absolute value to the Other.

For Scheler human love, as well as hatred, is, above all, a fundamental experience of life in terms of absolute values. Sartre emphasizes the affective basis of these "attitudes", aimed at the complete "absorption" of the Other: these are, primarily, the most powerful passions, which, however, can never be fully satisfied in their intentions.

Following phenomenological analysis, these mental states can be considered in their invariant senses; presumably, the emotional state of love reveals itself, primarily, as the joy of co-existence, whereas hatred can be considered as the complete inability of such an experience – as the striving for destroy everything around itself. Furthermore, existing in the form of emotional impulses affected by their interaction with external reality, and as opposite strives of the human soul, they still have different destinies, expressing in socio-cultural transformation of love but in incredible resistance of hate.

The basis of affective culture is, certainly, human relationships, mediated by a strong emotional field, a whole range of emotions and attachments, that is, by so-called affective relationships. Affective relationships are mostly relationships of love or hate. But to what extent do love relationships be subject to patterning or have an unconditional value, as argued by philosophers. To put it another way, whether it makes sense to regard love as an unconditional value, rather than a relational model (pattern), generated by a particular culture, which, moreover, is scarcely implemented in practice.

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ФІЛОСОФІЯ ЕМОЦІЙ МАКСА ШЕЛЕРА ТА ЖАНА-ПОЛЯ САРТРА ЯК ДВА «ПРОЄКТИ» В РАМКАХ СПІЛЬНОЇ ПАРАДИГМИ

Актуальність статті. У статті представлено порівняльний аналіз теоретичної спадщини найвидатніших представників феноменологічної думки, пов'язаної з розглядом надзвичайно складних питань усієї гуманітарної науки, а саме з питанням афективної природи людини. Актуальність аналізу визначається сучасною кризою емоційного життя, яка змушує нас дедалі більше звертати особливу увагу на трансцендентально-феноменологічну теорію емоцій, тісно пов'язану, перш за все, з такими авторами, як Макс Шелер та Жан-Поль Сартр, які, як відомо, досягли значного прогресу в цьому питанні.

Метою статті є розкриття сутнісних смислів (патернів) того, що зазвичай називають афективною культурою, і що концептуально було представлено у феноменологічній теорії емоцій вищезгаданими авторами, щоб підкреслити її штучність, а отже, існуючий розрив (розділність) між ідеалами почуттів та реальним емоційним життям.

Методи дослідження. Методологічною основою цього дослідження є переважно порівняльний аналіз, доповнений герменевтичним підходом та критичним аналізом, властивим філософському дискурсу як такому, а також використання загальних принципів наукового дослідження, таких як синтез й узагальнення.

Результати дослідження. Огляд феноменологічної теорії емоцій Шелера та Сартра дозволяє нам знову пересвідчитися у парадоксальності філософського мислення, яке полягає у дивовижному усвідомленні справжніх витоків афективного розвитку навіть з позиції феноменологічного підходу (який, як відомо, відкидає будь-яке метафізичне пояснення) та водночас у не менш дивовижному усвідомленні його майже повної неспроможності в реальному емоційному житті.

Феноменологія емоцій є надзвичайно цікавою, особливо якщо порівняти її з цілою низкою інших досліджень, головним чином, з психоаналітичним підходом, і особливо коли йдеться про Сартра. Як було з'ясовано цим оглядом, Шелер успішно поєднав феноменологічний аналіз, метафізику та соціокультурні доводи у своїй теорії *ordo amoris*, тоді як екзистенційна феноменологія Сартра виявилася більш об'єктивною та викривальною, ймовірно, співзвучною психоаналітичній критиці.

Ключові слова: афективна культура, афективний патерн, емоційні цінності, любовні стосунки, *ordo amoris*, феноменологія емоцій, феноменологічна онтологія свідомості.

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