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## УПРАВЛІННЯ ТА ІННОВАЦІЇ В ОСВІТІ: ДОСВІД, ПРОБЛЕМИ ТА ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ

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## ***ОРГКОМІТЕТ КОНФЕРЕНЦІЇ***

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До збірника увійшли матеріали міжнародної науково-практичної конференції, присвяченої управлінню закладами освіти, досвіду, проблемам та перспективам їх розвитку.

Науковці та здобувачі освіти висвітлюють питання щодо управління освітнім процесом в умовах розвитку інноваційного середовища та організаційно-психологічних аспектів менеджменту в освіті.

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**A NEW CHALLENGE FOR GEORGIA'S TRANSPORT AND  
COMMUNICATION SECURITY INTRODUCTION**

**Zurab Garakanidze, Georgia**

**Abstract**

Z. Garakanidze. A new challenge for Georgia's transport and communication security

The main supporters of the President D. Trump's initiated Zangezur Corridor (TRIPP) discussed in the article are the US, Armenian, Azerbaijani administrations and the Pan-Turkic forces of Turkey, which are trying to expand their influence in the Caspian Sea region, Central Asia and even on the projects of China's "Belt and Road Initiative". They rely on the points of the agreement that provide for: 1) unblocking economic and transport links in the region; 2) ensuring transport links between the western regions of Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan by Armenia along the banks of the Araks River; 3) construction of new transport links between Nakhchivan and other regions of Azerbaijan. Therefore, their statements about TRIPP as an alternative to the Georgia-EU Caspian hydrocarbons western "corridor" are unclear.

For example, in the Forbes, July 18, 2025, in an article titled "America's Growing Influence on the Zangezur: How a US-led Corridor Could Cut European Energy Prices and Counter Russia," Guney Yildiz writes: "This has serious implications for Europe's energy security. According to the IEA's 2025 World Energy Outlook, Europe will need 20 billion cubic meters more non-Russian gas by 2030. Normalized Armenian-Turkish borders could improve access to Caspian Sea reserves, potentially reducing import costs by 10-15 percent for companies like BP (Forbes, G. Yildiz, 2025).

This idea conflicts with the EU's BTC oil pipeline and the "Southern Gas Corridor" projects, which are supported by the European Union, as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan. This situation indicates the complex geopolitical dynamics in the region and the different interests of different parties regarding the development of energy routes.

We support that part of the experts who rightly disagree with this interpretation and present 4 arguments: a) the TRIPP agreement concerns only the movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo, and not the construction of a railway or the transportation of oil and gas; b) the so-called "Zangezur Corridor" (TRIPP) will pass through the territory of Armenia and will be controlled by the US military, i.e. on the 43 km bank of the Araks River, within the framework of one country, the US military will be located near the Russian Gyumri military base and the regional RF border guards, - one of the 4 detachments (Погранотряд) of Russian border guards deployed in Armenia. This one is directly deployed in Zangezur, in the city of Meghri (TASS, 2024); c) Deployment in the "Zangezur Corridor" the Russian border guards and the

Gyumri base poses a risk to both the pipelines of European energy companies and the entire transport infrastructure; d) The starting/ending points of the “Zangezur Corridor” are Azerbaijan and NATO member Turkey, and not the Syunik region of Armenia (Zangezur), i.e. the starting/ending points of the cargo will be in Turkey and Azerbaijan and the RF border guard nothing to do there.

Azerbaijan and Turkey have already agreed on the Baku-Erzurum-Nakhchivan gas pipeline project in February 2020. In the memorandum, Ilham Aliyev and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed their mutual interest in building a gas pipeline from Erzurum and Igdir to Nakhchivan, an autonomous region separated from the rest of Azerbaijan, via Georgia. The main topic of discussion during the talks was whether Turkey could help improve the energy security of Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan autonomous region, which is threatened by the Syunik (Zangezur) corridor in Armenia.

Keywords: Zangezur Corridor, Caspian Sea, Central Asia, Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, NATO, gas pipeline.

### **A NEW CHALLENGE FOR GEORGIA'S TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY INTRODUCTION**

In 2020-2024 the importance of transport and communication projects in strengthening Georgia's transit function was clearly highlighted. The value and place of this direction in Georgia's economic security policy are even better seen when we consider it on a regional scale. A trilateral regional agreement of this rank was signed between the USA, Azerbaijan and Armenia on August 8, 2025 and it was called the "Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity" – TRIPP agreement.

In order to protect itself from the threats emanating from its northern neighbor, Georgia is trying to deepen relations with neighboring countries and make the South Caucasus an economically stable, peaceful and desirable region. Currently, with the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the process of being resolved, Georgia has traditionally maintained a peaceful relationship with these two countries, as only good-neighborly relations can further develop the South Caucasus in the interests of common economic interests.

This is all the more significant when, in the wake of the 2008-09 global financial crisis, the rise of middle-income and emerging economies further reshaped the global economic order, reflecting their growing influence in promoting economic growth and integration [9]. However, while globalization and technological progress have brought significant benefits, they have also brought significant costs, including rising inequality and climate change. First, with the progress of global integration, factors of production are increasingly moving freely across sectors and borders. The result is growing inequality. This trend, particularly noticeable in developed economies since the 1980s [8] and in developing countries since the late 1990s [10], has led to a significant increase in income and wealth inequality. By 2020, more than 75% of the world's population lived in countries where income inequality had worsened since the 1990s [4].

Given this context, Georgia is keen to continue to maintain close economic relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The implementation of large-scale projects in the South Caucasus region is not only of economic importance. In addition to such a

burden, such projects are directly related to strengthening security. Over the years, the economic relationship between Georgia and Azerbaijan has established these two states as strategic partners. The “National Security Concept of Georgia” states that: “Projects for the creation of a unified energy, transport and communications network significantly contribute to the sustainability and development of both countries”[7].

#### Georgian Railway

It is true that the trilateral agreement of August 8, 2025 on the “Zangezur Corridor” refers to the Baku-Nakhchivan highway as the corridor route. In the event of the future operation of this corridor, it is likely that the completion of the “Iron Silk Way” project connecting Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) passing through Georgia will be postponed. The full opening of the BTK railway was planned back in 2017 - but its cargo turnover is already decreasing. With this communication, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia would strengthen their transit function and, at the same time, fully and effectively engage in international rail transportation. This railway should contribute to the expansion of economic and political ties between the East and the West and bring Georgia even closer to the Single European Economic Area. The “National Security Concept of Georgia” emphasizes that it is very important to support the competitiveness of this transport corridor through cooperation with Azerbaijan [7].

In addition, events in 2020-24 have developed so dynamically that it is necessary to reflect new political realities in EU projects. The so-called 44-day war in Karabakh, as well as the war in Ukraine, elections in Armenia and Iran, the Israeli-Hamas confrontation and the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in September 2021 - these new realities are bringing major changes to the region. The fact is that the current governments of Armenia and the Russian Federation did not immediately hide that they would try to open transport links with Azerbaijan and Turkey via Armenia. Armenia plans to build a new railway corridor from Meghri to Tabriz to Iran, parallel to the existing Derbent-Baku-Astara road in Azerbaijan. Therefore, Tehran is a competitor to the Baku-Meghri (Syunik region of Armenia, former Zangezur region)-Nakhchivan, or “Gateway to Turan”, initiative, which coincides with the US-initiated TRIPP. Iran has stated that it will not allow Baku to have transit hegemony along this new route along with the already existing Derbent-Baku-Astara, or “North-South” transport corridor.

Yerevan and Tehran want to balance the “North-South” Azerbaijani route with the Tabriz-Meghri railway. Significant changes are also observed in the EU TRACECA program. One of the goals of the trilateral ceasefire agreement brokered by the Russian Federation on November 9, 2020, was to establish communications through Armenia to the Caspian Sea coast.

We believe that it is more justified to build the Kars-Igdir-Nakhchivan railway line, that is, to continue the Georgia-Turkey route (BTK), on which the Turkey-Azerbaijan memorandum was signed in the spring of 2020 before the 44-day Karabakh war. This railway would be much safer than the reconstruction of the old Soviet railway Nakhchivan-Baku. Despite the fact that the Baku-Nakhchivan railway is the closest route connecting Azerbaijan with Turkey, its construction needs to be started from scratch - according to a study conducted by the international

organization IA in 2015, 104 km of railway from the Azerbaijani city of Horadiz to the Nakhchivan city of Ordubad have been demolished, 12 stations and 3 tunnels have been completely destroyed [3]. According to an approximate cost estimate, the construction of a 400 km modern “Ankara-Sivas” railway in Turkey in 2020 cost 1.5 billion euros [11]. If we take into account that the Horadiz-Ordubad section is 4 times shorter, then the construction of the railway in Zangezur alone, without the cost of stations and tunnels, will cost 375 million euros.

The interests of Russia and Iran include not Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, but the exploitation of Adler-Tbilisi-Gyumri-Kars and the connection of Gyumri not only with Turkey, but also with Russia and Iran, especially since this railway is still in excellent condition. For this reason, the US-initiated “Zangezur Corridor” (TRIPP) was immediately opposed by Iran. The same can be said about Turkey’s expressed desire to join the projects of the Chinese-initiated “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). Ankara has conflicts in its neighborhood and in the Mediterranean region. Amid the conflicts in Central Asia, Ankara may find its already tense relations with Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing even worse mainly due to the “Greater Turan” pan-Islamic project, which is on the same TRIPP route [5].

The geopolitical reality in Central Asia has already changed. Turkey is no longer the leading economic player in the region, as it was in the 1990s. Currently, China and Russia dominate as investors and trading partners. Therefore, Turkey supports TRIPP, which will help it implement the trans-Caspian projects of the old pan-Turkic “Gate of Turan” (Turkey-Central Asia), so that Central Asian resources and cargo are more oriented not towards China and Russia, but - again - towards Turkey. The fact is that Chinese and Russian companies have leading positions in the region’s transport and energy sectors. China and Russia are also trying to limit pan-Turkic influence in Central Asia.

Turkey and Azerbaijan have always continued to cooperate despite these challenges. On February 25, 2020, a few months before the Second Karabakh War, the leaders of the two countries signed a memorandum on the Kars-Igdir-Aralık-Diluchu-Sadarak-Nakhchivan-Julfa railway project. This agreement indicates that despite the existing challenges, Turkey and Azerbaijan were still trying to develop regional transport infrastructure. However, the successful implementation of the project depended not only on bilateral cooperation, but also on regional geopolitical dynamics and international economic factors.

The Kars-Igdir-Nakhchivan railway line, as a continuation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, was then considered more effective than the restoration-reconstruction of the Kars-Gyumri-Nakhchivan-Meghari-Baku Soviet railway. This is an important conclusion from the point of view of the development of regional transport infrastructure. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the interests of Russia and Iran are not the completion of Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars (BTK), - they want to restore the Adler-Tbilisi-Gyumri-Kars route. In addition, they are interested in establishing a connection from Gyumri not only with Turkey, but also with Iran. This indicates the different geopolitical interests in the region and the strategic importance of transport routes.

As noted above, in February 2020, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a memorandum on the construction of a railway line between Nakhchivan and the Turkish city of Kars. This project is an extension of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which will need to be reactivated, since the trilateral agreement on the “Zangezur Corridor” of August 8, 2025 does not mention the railway and only indicates a highway. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev noted the importance of the Kars-Igdir-Nakhchivan project in overcoming Nakhchivan’s economic isolation caused by the conflict with Armenia. According to him, this railway would improve the export of Nakhchivan’s products and contribute to the economic development of the region.

Although various agreements mention the possibility of laying communications through the Syunik (Zangezur) region of Armenia, this idea looks more like a fantasy than a real plan. The Baku-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway is still sufficient for Turkish-Azerbaijani economic cooperation.

Historically, the restoration of the Kars-Gyumri-Nakhchivan-Meghari-Baku railway was discussed as early as 2009 during the negotiations within the framework of the so-called Turkish-Armenian “football diplomacy”, but this idea did not develop. From a practical point of view, unlike the highway, as already mentioned, the continuation of the railway through Armenia is unlikely in the near future. All this indicates that the restoration of transport links in the region is a complex and long-term process, associated with many political and economic challenges (see Figure 1). Financing is the main challenge for the implementation of the land “Turanian Gateway” project. The highway along the Araks River is operational, but the restoration of the railway requires significant financial resources. Figure 1 shows the inactive railway as a dotted line.

At the same time, Turkey’s participation in the global projects of the “Belt and Road Initiative” has already been decided, despite Ankara’s confrontation with both its immediate neighbors and other Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, Turkey’s desire to get involved in the Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) and, especially, the US-initiated TRIPP projects in Central Asia is likely to complicate its already tense relations with Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing. This indicates the complex diplomatic and economic relations in our region, and their further strain.


Regarding the US-initiated TRIPP and the maritime dimension of the Turkish “Turanian Gateway”, it is worth noting that cargo traffic in the Mediterranean-Black Sea basin and towards the world oceans is steadily increasing. Experts advise Georgian ports to make every effort to capture Central Asian cargo, although competition in maritime cargo transportation is constantly growing. Also interesting are the active steps of the Turkish government to turn the country into a transport “hub”. Namely: 1) In the 90s, the reconstruction of all five Turkish ports on the Black Sea was completed; 2) A large railway junction was created in Ankara and a new airport was built in Istanbul; 3) In 2013, a road tunnel was laid under the Bosphorus Strait, and in 2018, the “Marmaray” railway tunnel; 4) On June 26, 2021, the construction of the “Istanbul Canal” began, which will be completed in 2027. The “Istanbul Canal” project is especially interesting for Georgian ports.

Georgian ports



What is the maritime dimension of the “Turanian Gateway” that forms part of the “Greater Turan” and the US-initiated TRIPP projects, similar to each other, as competitors to the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI)? This is, first of all, the corridor of Islamic countries stretching from the Balkans to Altai through the Bosphorus Strait. For this, Turkey is pedaling ecological problems on the Bosphorus, which became especially acute in 1994, after the sinking of the Cypriot tanker “Nasiya”, when hundreds of thousands of tons of oil spilled into the strait in the center of Istanbul. At that time, the Bosphorus Strait threatened the megapolis with an ecological catastrophe. After that, discussions began on the construction of the “Istanbul Canal” bypassing the Bosphorus and the creation of an environmental fund for the strait. At the same time, restrictions were imposed on the passage of “merchant ships” through the straits, which are free to navigate under the Montreux Convention.

Figure



Source: America's High-Stakes Bet On Zangezur: How A U.S.-Led Corridor Could Slash Europe's Energy Costs and Counter Russia 18:06  
[https://news.am/eng/news/895072.html#google\\_vignette](https://news.am/eng/news/895072.html#google_vignette)

Thus, Turkey has long been using navigation restrictions and may revive the idea of creating a “Straits Environmental Fund” voiced several years ago, which would involve paying a fee for tankers crossing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Ankara explains the introduction of this fee by Turkey's accession to various environmental conventions.

At first glance, the “Istanbul Canal” will also create certain problems for the ports of the middle corridor in terms of increasing maritime transportation in the



Black Sea. However, the construction of a 44 km long, 275 m wide and 20.75 m deep canal near Istanbul can “contribute” to the opening of the Abkhazian section of the Georgian Railway, that is, to the development of land transportation by Russia itself. The so-called. Russia will be primarily interested in the opening of the Abkhazian Railway, because in this way it will gain access to the railway highways of its allies - Iran, India. Through the Georgian Railway, Russia will be able to export oil products to the West not only by sea, but also by land - via the Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. This would be much cheaper than transporting oil through the Bosphorus Strait with its expected annual quotas (environmental restrictions), or using the future Istanbul Canal (the construction of which is scheduled for completion in 2027) with paid services, which would significantly increase the cost of Russian and Kazakh oil. The fact is that after the construction of this canal and the transportation of Russian and Kazakh oil through it, Turkey will restrict the free movement of dangerous goods through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits in peacetime, in accordance with environmental requirements. Although the straits are considered neutral waters by the Montreux Convention of 1936 and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, environmental restrictions were rarely used at the time of the adoption of these conventions. Now Turkey can impose such restrictions, which will make the use of the straits very expensive.

The opportunities for sea transportation of cargo for the countries of the South Caucasus have a wide range in their economies. Georgia is one of them and is no exception. Currently, three sea ports and two oil terminals are functional in Georgia, and the construction of an additional one - the Anaklia port - is only a matter of time. This is due to the fact that the existing port and railway infrastructure in Georgia cannot meet modern requirements, especially in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, when they have to cope with an increased volume of cargo [2]. The construction of the Anaklia port is not only in the interests of the Georgian side: all countries involved in TRACECA have an interest in the construction of the mentioned port, as this will allow Georgia to transport more cargo supplied by them than it could before [6].

The idea of the “Canal Istanbul” was born 11 years ago, but its implementation began only in 2021 due to internal and external obstacles. The construction of the canal will last 6 years and will cost 15 billion dollars. The above confirms that there is competition in the region for the creation of transport and logistics hubs. Turkey, Georgia and other countries are trying to strengthen their positions in this area. At the same time, geopolitical interests and regional conflicts have a significant impact on these processes. The implementation of the aforementioned “canal” project is a strategic task, which, on the one hand, can defuse the Bosphorus and, on the other hand, increase Turkey’s influence on a global scale - that is, promote the idea of “Greater Turan”.

The increase in the intensity of navigation in the Turkish Straits and the need to build a new canal can be confirmed by the following data: in 1938, 4.5 thousand ships entered the Bosphorus, in 1985 - 24 thousand, in 1996-2000 - already 47-50 thousand ... In an exclusive interview with Trend, Turkish Minister of Transport and

Infrastructure Adil Karaismailoglu noted that due to the growth of economic activity in the Black Sea basin, this figure may reach 86 thousand in the coming decade. However, according to the Turkish Ministry of Transport, the number of ships passing through the Bosphorus has gradually decreased over the past 15 years: from 88 in 2006 it reduced to 54 in 2020, but increased tonnage.

#### Geopolitical Calculations and Rivalry

The success of the corridor will fundamentally alter regional power dynamics. Iran faces the prospect of losing 20-30 percent of its transit role, disrupting critical trade links, including the 43000 Turkish trucks that pass through Central Asia each year. Russia faces a loss of \$10-20 billion in revenue over a decade and expects a 10-15 percent reduction in its indirect influence on European energy markets [1] (Forbes, 2025).

The “Zangezur Corridor” is a defining test of the US’s ability to create mutually beneficial solutions in conflict regions.

Meanwhile, China plans to increase the efficiency of the Belt and Road by \$20-30 billion by 2030 through improved connectivity. However, Beijing must balance these gains with the risk of reducing its reliance on Chinese-controlled routes. The new “corridor” could turn Turkey into a critical energy hub with direct access to Turkic-speaking countries, potentially bringing it \$10-15 billion in annual transit revenue by 2030.

Some energy companies are also looking to cash in. While the Zangezur deal mentions energy in general, SOCAR is expanding pipeline capacity, while ADNOC will service hydrogen joint ventures. BP and Chevron are forecasting \$5-10 billion in investment from increased export revenues. However, the “political deadlock” could increase the project’s costs by 20 percent, while regulatory delays could push the timeline beyond a viable investment horizon.

Turkish businesses operating in the eastern Anatolian provinces predict a 310 percent increase in export volumes if the corridor is implemented, from \$160 million to \$500 million per year. This economic momentum provides a strong incentive for diplomatic engagement.

#### Conclusions

Despite the compelling economic picture, significant risks remain for the future corridor. Observers place a 60 percent chance of negotiations breaking down, potentially delaying the project by 12-18 months. According to Lloyd’s, as of June 2025, if negotiations break down, commodity prices could rise by 20 percent and insurance premiums could rise by 20 percent.

This process has not been without negative consequences for Russia and Iran. Iran has always opposed any changes to the northern borders surrounding the South Caucasus region. The “Zangezur Corridor” would ensure the free movement of people and goods between Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan and from there to Central Asia, without passing through Iranian or Russian territory, which would strengthen the positions of anti-Iranian pan-Turkism.

Turkey strongly supports the project. Although Armenia and Azerbaijan previously had good relations with Moscow, the situation has become tense in recent years. According to US officials, the “Zangezur Corridor” would bring billions of

dollars in trade turnover to the US annually and reduce the influence of Russia, Iran and China in the region.

Armenia has categorically rejected discussions about leasing or transferring territorial control. Government spokeswoman Nazeli Baghdasaryan has stated firmly that "...Armenia has not considered and will not consider transferring control of its sovereign territory to any third party." This resistance underscores a fundamental challenge facing U.S. mediators.

The success of the Zangezur initiative demonstrates Washington's ability to create solutions that resist the influence of rivals while serving tangible economic interests. Failure could indicate a diminished U.S. ability to shape negative outcomes in conflict regions.

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Секція 3	
GARAKANIDZE <i>Zurab A new challenge for Georgia's transport and communication security</i>	46
ДАКАЛ Алла <i>Спільні й відмінні чинники публічного управління у сфері освіти України та Польщі</i>	55
РУЧКІНА Маріанна, ТАН Цінцін <i>Підвищення кваліфікації науково-педагогічних кадрів в умовах глобальних освітніх трансформацій</i>	58
ЯКУБОВСЬКА Олена <i>Управління закладом дошкільної освіти в умовах сучасних змін</i>	61
Секція 4	
БАРАБАСЬ Дмитро <i>Культура інновацій у закладах вищої освіти</i>	64
ГОРЛІЧЕНКО Марина, ЛЮ Даньдань <i>Інноваційний розвиток закладу освіти –вимога часу</i>	67
КНЯЖЕВ Ігор <i>Технологізація педагогічної освіти: інноваційний вимір сучасного навчання</i>	68
КОВІЛІНА Вероніка <i>The role of innovative educational technologies in forming teachers' readiness for inclusive preschool education</i>	70
МАЛОФЕЄНКО Марина <i>Сучасні підходи науковців до професійного розвитку вихователів закладу дошкільної освіти</i>	74
RUSNAC Svetlana <i>Artificial intelligence in the development of university competencies: risks, opportunities and the institutional ethical framework</i>	76
RUSNAC Svetlana, MUSIENCO Natalia <i>Modular approach to curriculum design: perspectives for quality enhancement and program internationalization</i>	79
ТЕЛЕМУХА Святослав, ПИПТЮК Олександр, САБАДАШ Ростислав, ПАВЛЯК Андрій, ІВАНОЧКО Наталія, МІЩУК Віталій <i>Метод проектів в навчанні студентів медиків</i>	82
ХРОМЕЦЬ Вікторія <i>Організація психологічної служби в закладах вищої освіти України в сучасних умовах</i>	87
ШАТНИЙ Сергій, ШАТНА Анастасія, РЕУТ Дмитро, БОЙЧУРА Михайло, СИДОР Андрій <i>Методологічні основи та дидактичні принципи індивідуалізованого навчання в сучасній освіті</i>	89
ШТАЙНЕР Тетяна <i>Інтеграція інноваційних підходів у зміст дисциплін дизайнерського профілю як засіб формування професійної компетентності майбутніх фахівців</i>	91
Секція 5	
БИКОВА Наталія, ТАТАРИНОВА Світлана <i>Трансформація системи захисту дітей в умовах воєнного стану в Україні</i>	95
БРЮХОВЕЦЬКА Наталя <i>Підготовка есе у системі формування мислячого здобувача та працівника-спеціаліста</i>	97
ВЕЛИЧКО Тетяна <i>Підготовка майбутніх педагогів до формування ціннісних орієнтацій у дітей старшого дошкільного та молодшого</i>	99