




**АКТУАЛЬНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ ФІЛОЛОГІЇ  
І ПРОФЕСІЙНОЇ ПІДГОТОВКИ ФАХІВЦІВ  
У ПОЛІКУЛЬТУРНОМУ ПРОСТОРИ**



Одеса  
2024

**АКТУАЛЬНІ ПРОБЛЕМИ ФІЛОЛОГІЇ І ПРОФЕСІЙНОЇ  
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У ПОЛІКУЛЬТУРНОМУ ПРОСТОРІ**



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## ЗМІСТ

ВСТУП.....	13
<b>СЕКЦІЯ I. НАГАЛЬНІ ПИТАННЯ ВІТЧИЗНЯНОГО ТА ЗАРУБІЖНОГО ПЕРЕКЛАДОЗНАВСТВА.....</b>	<b>16</b>
<i>Bieliaievska Victoriia.</i> Translation Aspects of Conveying Emotive Content in the Series «The Crown»	16
<i>Gao Kaiyu.</i> A Study of The Translation Methods of Culture-Loaded Words in Chinese White Paper – A Case Study on China’s Armed Forces: 30 Years of UN Peacekeeping Operations	18
<i>Guo Yan.</i> A Study on The Untranstability and Translation Strategies of Machine-Assisted Translation in Military Texts	20
<i>Гуціна Віра.</i> «Blue Horse? Dancing Mountains» Роджера Желязни: враження перекладача <i>杜亚茹.</i> 翻译过程中词义选择的探究	21
<i>Ищенко Анна.</i> Особливості перекладу власних імен у Романах Дж. К. Роулінг Про Гаррі Поттера та серіалі «Fantastic Beasts»	24
<i>Li Baofeng, Suo Zhiyi.</i> On the Domestication of the English–Chinese Subtitle Translation with the Big Bang Theory as a Case	27
<i>Li Baofeng, Wen Yu.</i> Exploring Popular Science Translation Through the Prism of Adaptation Theory: Insights from The Economist's Scientific Narratives	28
<i>Li Xiaojie.</i> A Study on the Translation of the Subtitles of <i>Empresses in The Palace</i>	30
<i>Попович Елеонора.</i> Аналіз перекладацьких трансформацій у книзі Сюзанни Коллінз «Голодні Ігри»	31
<i>Popova Oleksandra.</i> Synergism Of Translation in the Academic Sphere	33
<i>Сонко Юрій.</i> Переклад Художніх Текстів: Виклики Та Можливості	36
<i>Wang Qingzhong, Li Shengnan, Yin Wenjie, Bai Jing, Guo Yan.</i> An Analysis of the Application of Artificial Intelligence in the Translation of Shipbuilding Engineering English Text - Taking Chatgpt as an Example	39
<i>Yang Zhibo.</i> Poems from the Perspective of Relevance Theory: A Case Study of Two Translation Versions of Xu Yuanchong and Zhu Manhua	40
<i>Zhang Xueqing, Liang Hong.</i> Cross-Model Comparison: The Effectiveness of Large Language Models in Translating Political Texts	42
<b>СЕКЦІЯ II. АКТУАЛЬНІ ПИТАННЯ ЗАГАЛЬНОГО І ЗІСТАВНОГО МОВОЗНАВСТВА.....</b>	<b>44</b>
<i>Бошков Андрій.</i> Типологія дискурсу як об’єкта лінгвістичних досліджень	44
<i>Ivanenko Alexander V.</i> Chronicle Settlement <i>Оргоуць</i> : To the Issue of the Origin of the Oikonym	46
<i>Iliadi Alexander I.</i> East Slavic <i>Раба</i> : A Case of Mythologizing Of Social Terminological Semantics	48
<i>Tsapro Galyna, Olena Gryshchenko.</i> How One Can Fake it: Adverbs Revealing the Act of Deception	52
<b>СЕКЦІЯ III. МІЖКУЛЬТУРНА КОМУНІКАЦІЯ В СУЧАСНОМУ ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНОМУ ПРОСТОРИ.....</b>	<b>55</b>
<i>Li Baofeng, Wang Ruiqi.</i> Research and Enlightenment of Brazil’s Diversified Sports Diplomacy Strategy	55
<i>Muzychenko Ganna.</i> The Current Ukrainian Party Landscape	56
<i>Shi Yixuan, Li Baofeng, Hou Runhua.</i> Cross-Cultural Communication of South Korean Films from a Geopolitical Perspective	59
<i>Tang Qiang, Che Dewei.</i> The Strategies of China’s Image Construction in the Context of Multicultural Communication: a Case Study of the English Version of the 20th National Congress Report	60
<i>Wang Xiaohui, Li Hejuan.</i> Chinese-English Puns and Transmission of Cultural Values in Cross-Cultural Communication	61

## References:

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## THE CURRENT UKRAINIAN PARTY LANDSCAPE

**Keywords:** *party landscape, Ukraine, political parties.*

The political party activities in Ukraine are regulated by legal norms. The Law “On Political Parties in Ukraine” has been in force since 2001. According to this Law, “a political party is a legally registered voluntary association of citizens who are supporters of a certain national program of social development, aimed at promoting the formation and expression of the political will of citizens, and participates in elections and other political events” [1].

According to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, the number of registered political parties at the beginning of 2019 was about 350, but no more than 50 parties participated in the active political life. Only some of them participated in elections. For example, 22 political parties took part in the parliamentary elections-2019, but only 5 of them were able to enter the Parliament and overcome the 5% barrier.

By the end of 2019, the Servant of the People party practically controlled the entire system of political decision-making in the country, which made it possible to implement any programs and ideas. The level of trust in the new political force was maximal. The society was waiting for a real breakthrough in the economy, the fight against corruption, the entry into the European Union, etc. All these were the points of the President’s and Servant of the People party’s programs.

However, the first year already showed a lack of concrete steps and success. Disagreements began within the party itself, leading to a change in the leadership of the Parliament, the resignation of the Government and other personnel changes.

As a result, during the first year of Zelenskyy's presidency, his and the pro-presidential Servant of the People party's ratings began to fall rapidly. There are many reasons for the fall: voters' disappointment from high expectations and a number of objective factors. For example, Zelenskyy's reign experienced an unprecedented global crisis associated with the coronavirus pandemic. The epidemic helped cover up some mistakes of the Zelenskyy's administration, and the decline in the economy began even before the pandemic, but overall, the new president's team was very unlucky. Hopes for an influx of foreign investors have been dashed. Zelenskyy's team failed to deliver the promised economic growth. The fall in GDP by May 2020 had already amounted to 5.9%.

To this list, we can add the land reform with the opening of the land market, lack of success in the fight against corruption, unresolved issues in Donbass and worsening relations with Russia.

From the moment of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the President and the entire society were required to make quick decisions and show the cohesive work of all institutions of the Government and society. Almost immediately the question of banning the activities of all pro-Russian political parties and severing all ties with the aggressor country arose. Already on March 18, 2022, the President signed Decree No. 153/2022 on the implementation of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine decision "On the suspension of the activities of certain political parties" [2].

All political parties that conduct anti-Ukrainian political and organizational activities, war propaganda, public statements and calls for changing the constitutional system by force, real threats of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, and undermining its security are banned.

The political party "OPPOSITION PLATFORM – FOR LIFE", which was the second largest political force in the parliament, was officially banned. Currently, the members of the party fraction have scattered among the parliamentary groups: in April, 2022, the "Platform for Life and Peace" group was created, and in May, – the "Restoration of Ukraine" group. In essence, the ban on pro-Russian parties removed competition in the vision of the future, but did not exclude the presence of opposition in the country. Competition in party activities now is not about the vector of the country's movement, but about the methods and means of such a path. Representatives of other parliamentary parties – "European Solidarity", "Batkivshchyna" and "Holos" – are trying to take the place of the oppositionists. However, it should be noted that these parties today are more likely to serve as critics of the current government, rather than as carriers of alternative scenarios for the future of the country.

The Razumkov Center sociological research conducted in March, 2024 pointed that only 13% of the respondents trust political parties, but when asked whether they see among the existing political forces those that could be entrusted with power in the post-war period, 25% of the respondents give an affirmative (positive) answer. Among politicians, respondents most often expressed trust in V. Zelenskyy (69%), V. Kim (58%), S. Prytula (54%), D. Kuleba (50%). The majority of the respondents do not trust Yu. Tymoshenko (80,5%), Yu. Boyko (78%), P. Poroshenko (70%), O. Arestovych (79%) [3].

As we see, the war made its own adjustments to the balance of political forces. At the same time, the ruling political party “Servant of the People” and especially the current President increased their ratings and removed their main opposition members – pro-Russian parties – from politics.

But the war also gave rise to new alternatives. Among those who see existing political forces as those that could be entrusted with power in the post-war period, 55% responded that such a political force could emerge from already existing political parties. Although 56% of them share an opinion that such a political force could emerge from the military representatives.

A political force that can be entrusted with power in the post-war period, most often, in the opinion of citizens, can emerge from the military representatives (51% of the respondents think so), 26% of the respondents are of the opinion that it can emerge from already existing political parties, 24% – from the volunteer environment, 18.5% – from civil society organizations, 17% – from the circle of humanitarian or technical intelligentsia, 8% – from the business sector [3].

To sum up, it can be argued that the party landscape of Ukraine today is heterogeneous, even though there are no visible alternatives for the country’s development. The majority of the population supports the democratic pro-Western scenario for the country’s development, with various existing options for achieving it. However, the party landscape of Ukraine is in anticipation of inevitable changes associated with the emergence of new political forces from the military representatives and volunteers, which in the further elections may change the list of parties, lead to the emergence of new leaders, but not the country’s development scenario.

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