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K. D. Ushynsky**

Harbin Engineering University

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This international yearbook, as a periodical, includes scientific articles of Ukrainian and Chinese scholars on the problems of Sinology, Cross-cultural Communication, Pedagogics and Psychology: contemporary review. Odessa, Ukraine.

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The third issue of the materials represented by the Ukrainian and Chinese scholars are dedicated to acute issues of General and Contrastive Linguistics within the Chinese, English, Ukrainian and Russian languages; linguodidactic problems of teaching native and foreign languages within polycultural educational space; peculiarities of cross-cultural communication in geopolitical space alongside with educational aspects of professional training of future specialists under conditions of multicultural environment.

The given articles may be of use to researchers, graduate students, postgraduates and practising teachers who are interested in various aspects of Sinology, Cross-cultural Communication, Pedagogics and Psychology.

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SECTION III
CROSSCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN THE MODERN
GEOPOLITICAL SPACE

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SETTLEMENT OF THE RUSSIAN - UKRAINIAN CONFLICT AS A
GUARANTEED SECURITY FOR EUROPEAN SPACE

The article reports that there is a reasonable position of analysts who believe that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict certainly determines present and future of the EU and the entire Atlantic Europe. This influence can have both negative effects and cause discrepancies between the EU Member States on economic, political, military issues as well as positive ones – a unifying platform for cooperation and efforts to position the background external threat.

***Key words:** security, Russian-Ukrainian conflict, European space sanctions, EU Member States, the common position.*

The reaction of the international community in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is not always straightforward and sometimes is characterized by contradictory positions. Despite substantial international support, there remains a controversial issue of granting Ukraine lethal weapons, primarily for defensive purposes. Since Western politicians try to resolve the conflict diplomatic way and hope for the implementation of the Minsk agreements, the use of military pressure instruments are likely to complicate the situation. Thus, the efforts of the international community are mainly aimed at avoiding direct military confrontation with Russia

and Western partners, whereas the rejection of the use of military instruments of deterrence Ukraine to talk with leaders of so called "LNR" and "DNR" and strengthen the position of the Russian side and their belief in impunity dominating power over the principle of law. Therefore, Kyiv's question to the Russian concerning implementation of the Minsk agreements is fundamental, since it will enable the Ukrainian authorities to regain the control over the eastern border and gradually, with the support of the international community to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. It is important to Western partners who still require the implementation of the previously signed agreements and preservation / strengthening sanctions against Russia until the full implementation of the Minsk agreements and restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, including the Crimea.

In the creation and implementation of foreign policy, the European Union has always played an important role and still plays due to positions and interests of individual member states. This stems primarily from the restrictions associated with unanimate voting in the EU Council and the European Council on the basic amount of foreign policy and security issues. In most cases, it is necessary to achieve the consensus of the Member States regarding certain actions and decisions of the EU. And if it fails, then the consensus that acquires the forms of "rotten compromise" will operate, [1, p. 35] which seem to have effectiveness of joint activities.

Therefore, the position of the EU on the international stage is often the "lowest common denominator", the process of working hours is long lasting and requires much energy is used to resolve internal disputes, instead of forming a strong common position in relation to other states.

The positions of the Member States are very important for the formation of a comprehensive long-term strategy for the EU, which would be aimed at strengthening Ukrainian statehood and integration of our country to Europe and coherent EU policy towards Russia under conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Therefore, understanding how serious the differences between the Member States are and how to change this situation is paramount.

The Russian-Ukrainian military conflict demonstrates weak cohesion of Europe to external threats, the main reason why, no doubt, is the divergence of interests of the EU member states in terms of their foreign policy priorities in general and towards Eastern Europe in particular. The main interests of most the EU countries in Eastern Europe are economic in nature, related to energy and access to markets. The interest of some of the EU in cooperation with Eastern Europe also follows the issues of security and immigration. But in general we can speak of the traditional Member States' deficit of political will and common interest to form policy towards its eastern neighbours. Eastern Dimension of the EU policy that was of particular importance for Brussels after extensions in 2004 and 2007, has remained one of the most controversial and contradictory assumptions among members of the Union. Finally, D. Milcharek points out correctly that the formation of a common coherent EU policy towards Eastern Europe recipients was not conducive ambivalent positions within this policy.

The advantages of the Revolution in Ukraine and the Russian-Ukrainian war, unfortunately has not led to the formation of a broad consensus in the united Europe. On this occasion, the American realist Robert Kagan notes that "even the Europeans of XXI century, despite all the benefits of their union, are unable to unite against a predator in their environment and, in the past, willing to give at the mercy of the weakest to save their own (financial) skins". In our opinion, such a verdict is exaggerated and perhaps premature. Indeed, although there are doubts, some EU countries do not still approve, for example, increased economic sanctions and other restrictive measures towards Russia, but in the end the is such a result: still no Member State has dared to use the veto right joint action or EU position on these issues. At the meeting of the Union for Foreign Affairs in June 22, 2015 automatically without discussing the sanctions against Russia were extended until 31 January 2016. The EU countries adhere to a common position on the rejection of the Russian actions in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia by consensus of all 28 members is considered a significant achievement. However, it is necessary to agree with John Sherr that Russia's policy towards Ukraine is largely fueled by the

conviction that the lack of resources and core national interests outweigh leading European countries and will enable Russia to realize its interests in future. However, says the expert, the idea of the Kremlin was false [0, p. 89]

Reaching consensus among the 28 EU member states is - a complex process. While discussing the extension of sanctions against Russia, one cannot mention the introduction of new restrictive measures, serious differences remain and presuppose continuous discussions on the matter. Among the EU countries, on the one hand, there are "hawks" calling rigidly to resist Russia, strengthen economic sanctions and provide active support to Ukraine. Some even involves supplying weapons for protection. Since the beginning of this hard way chosen Poland, the Baltic States, perhaps to a lesser extent - Romania have experienced it. Each of them has its own internal reasons, related primarily to the near history. This group is comprised by the United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries.

Poland, Lithuania and Estonia were the first to formulate the earliest and most fundamental position on the "Ukrainian crisis," the Russian annexation and subsequent military campaign in the Donbass. The Foreign Minister of Poland, together with his French and German counterparts were intermediary in the negotiations between the protesters and the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich in February 20, 2014, while Lithuania has used its presidency of the UN Security Council to convene an emergency meeting on the Ukrainian issue. In turn, the Estonian President T. H. Ilves at the meeting with the Ukrainian leaders in September 2014 said that the Ukrainian-Russian conflict is - a "war between" Europe and non-Europe, a conflict between different value systems [0, p.3]. In response to the violence against Euromaidan Estonia, Lithuania and Poland gave the wounded Ukrainian health care in their hospitals. In addition, all three countries have mobilized strong reaction of a civil society to the events in Ukraine.

Although the position of Poland and the Baltic countries, which have long pointed to the threat from Russia (in 2009 a group of experts from Central Europe warned in an open letter to the administration of Barack Obama, published in *Gazeta Wyborcza* that Russia is returning to the policy of the nineteenth century with tactics

and methods of the XXI century [0]) has long been the position of the minority and they were called alarmists, with the growth of aggressive behaviour of Russia and increased the intensity of the fighting in eastern Ukraine, it gradually became a majority position. The leading role in this process is played by Germany, as Angela Merkel has made great efforts to agree the EU institutions common position on Russia's actions in Ukraine and sanctions considering them as "necessary and inevitable".

A clear and unambiguous position of German Chancellor was made in November 2014 after Brisbane summit of G20: "We can not afford beating the old notion of spheres of influence, along side with neglecting the of the international law. "We will oppose this policy", no matter how long it could not last. The matter is how hard it was and how much failure it could bring. According to John Sherr, with its resolute, methodical and consistent approach, Angela Merkel during the past year was the embodiment of Western firmness and solidarity [Op. 89].

However, some EU countries have taken an ambiguous stance on Ukraine and Russia in the current war. They are conventionally called "Russia's understanders" ("those who understand Russia"). France, South Union Member States (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, South-East Europe) do not no hurry to confront with Russia through Ukraine. It is possible that some EU countries in the future may veto new sanctions against Russia or block their extension. Such intentions have been repeatedly expressed in government circles in Italy, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece and Hungary. Some warning at various times were put forward by representatives of the authorities of Austria and France.

The position of some Central European countries on Russian-Ukrainian conflict may seem surprising and rather uncertain. Despite the common history like a Soviet satellite, and (most of them) a direct occupation of Moscow is in the twentieth century is obvious. Still fresh is the experience of your own transition, good understanding of contemporary Eastern Europe and Russia, proximity to the conflict zone, deep historical, cultural, social and economic ties with its neighbors in the East, the region is surprisingly divided in relation to the Russian-Ukrainian

conflict. Unlike Poland and the Baltic States, the response of the southern part of Central Europe to the events was more restrained. It ranged from cautious condemnation of Russia's actions in Bulgaria, noticeable distancing of these issues in Romania, quiet pragmatism in Slovakia and clear pro-Russian vote in the Czech Republic and Hungary. The representatives of these countries at meetings of the European Council either are silent of the Ukrainian issue or take too vague or non-pro-Ukrainian position. The debate in the EU on sanctions against Russia have only deepened the differences between the countries of Central Europe.

On it should be bear in mind that the key line of the conduct of the Russian Federation in the European direction today is to encourage divisions within the united Europe, where noticeable are hesitation and reluctance of some countries to follow the economic losses due to the introduction of sanctions. It hopes to divide Europe and weaken the West, to increase its own importance in the world. Europe is slowly moving in understanding the nature and danger of the Russian challenge.

The influence of Germany played a crucial role not only in implementing effective sanctions of the EU against Russia in March 2014 and their expansion in July and September 2014, but also in disrupting the pipeline project "South Stream", stopping / slowing the convergence of Hungary and Russia, dragging France with a group of skeptics on the issue of sanctions to the opposite camp and indirect impact through Paris to other southern member states. In general, German policy coincides with fits into the overall approach to the conflict, the European Union, which includes 3 components: Sanctions against Russia, financial support of Ukraine and search format of negotiations for the solutions within certain aspects of the conflict diplomatically. Germany strongly supports sanctions against Russia for the purpose of putting pressure on Moscow to end fighting in Eastern Ukraine, but is also actively working to create the conditions under which they may be eliminated in the future. This refers to the efforts of Germany's bilateral activity with France with a view to a political settlement, support of the contact group set up under the auspices of the OSCE, the US coordination of a united Europe. Angela Merkel realizes that

to increase the sanctions against Russia might make the EU members dissatisfied get it is necessary to progress in resolving the conflict long.

The current position of Germany concerning the Ukrainian-Russian conflict demonstrates significant modification of its eastern policy. The chancellor G. Schroeder and A. Merkel think that German accents of Eastern policy are focused mainly on Russia – a close relationship with it have a long historical tradition, and now both sides are important partners for each other, especially in the economic sphere. The trade turnover between Germany and Russia in 2013 amounted to 76.5 billion euros [0, p. 90]. Russian annexation of the Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine had led to greater realism in German policy towards Russia. This gives enough reason to believe that in the near future the paradigm of German Eastern policy may change, in particular its attitude to Russia, Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus in terms of "Eastern Partnership".

Today among German politicians, researchers, activists and journalists engaged into the Ukrainian-Russian conflict with science, journalism or social position, is the debate about the interpretation and evaluation of the events in Ukraine. On 5 December, 2014 60 prominent representatives of German political, business and cultural spheres published their ideas in the newspapers "Die Zeit" and "Der Tagesspiegel", and later Russian online inoSMY.Ru appealed "a new war in Europe. Not in our name!" Known as "Call of 60 German celebrities." In it, they asked Berlin to continue its partnership with Moscow. A week later, in mid-December 2014, 142 German experts on Eastern Europe published in the newspaper "Zeit Online" (Hamburg), "Der Tagesspiegel", "Die Welt", "Berliner Zeitung" (Berlin) and "Der Standard" (Vienna) a response, which called to ensure that German policy towards Russia are based on realities, not illusions. Noting that "this war is a clear aggressor and the victim is clearly identified," the signatories said that "we, Germans, can not again turn a blind eye when it comes to the sovereignty of one of the former Soviet republics, the survival of the Ukrainian state is "in our own interests opposed to the export anti-liberal ideas of the Kremlin in the EU" [0].

This discussion, formal statements of many members of the German political elite and the country's position in the EU concerning the Ukrainian-Russian war show that many members of the German political elite, including the Social Democrats and the business community have changed their attitude to Russia, and then there is a chance that in the near future the Eastern policy of Germany will be more realistic and balanced in the context of relations with Russia.

The differences in the approaches of the Member States to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict led to the formation of a double strategy of the European Union on the one hand – sanctions against Russia, and on the other – search for a talk format to resolve the conflict diplomatically. In spite of existing agreements with Russia in various formats ("Geneva", "Normandy"), and above all Minsk-1 and Minsk-2, they have not been executed and Kyiv is still suffering aggression, diplomatic way to turn Russia into a more "cooperative" status seems problematic.

Secondly, they must have a common position and vision of what should happen if the sanctions were extended. Will ceasefire be sufficient or is it necessary to fully implement the Minsk agreement, including the establishment of effective control over the Ukrainian constitutional authorities of the Russian-Ukrainian border.

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict will depend on the determination of the positions of Ukraine and the willingness of the West to some losses for restoring world order according to the established international law. It is reasonable for the absence of a military solution to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but the obvious is the fact that some diplomatic or economic measures might not resolve it. Therefore, it is the development and implementation of the world community (including Ukraine) to initiate asymmetric comprehensive program for aggressive Russian actions, the components of which may be the subject of further fundamental research. Among its key elements there should be singled out strengthening of economic sanctions, political and moral isolation of the Russian Federation to stop the aggression, changes in regional security and a more rigid, active defense system, extensive involvement of the tools of modern diplomacy into the conflict and substantial international assistance of Ukraine.

Priority is acquired for successful reforms in Ukraine and consolidation of forces within the country that, firstly, increase legitimacy, and secondly, to improve social and economic standards of the state. Implementation of certain tasks and complicated through commercialization values as a clear sign of the modern world, where the material things are more preferable than spiritual ones and where over the spiritual and sense of stability prevails over the need for a radical change in international relations. Therefore, you should look for alternative ways of strengthening the international order to meet the new challenges of the modern globalized world.

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乌克兰，敖德萨

欧洲安全框架下的俄罗斯-乌克兰冲突处置

笔者认为，俄罗斯-乌克兰冲突对欧盟乃至欧洲-大西洋区域目前及未来的安全形势将造成的决定性影响。这种影响会为欧盟成员国在经济、政治、军事合作等方面业已存在的差异带来负面作用；亦会为其在应对潜在威胁时建立联合应对机制产生积极作用。本文旨在对这一观点进行合理的定位分析。

关键词：安全，俄乌冲突，欧洲生存空间，制裁，欧盟成员国，共同立场

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LOCAL AND REGIONAL IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DAILY POLITICAL PROCESSES IN EUROPE

In the article the problem of the regional political identity, its types, structure, conditions of formation were discovered. There was analyzed the influence of the regional identity on the political processes in the European countries.